Abstract. Restricted quantification poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for nonclassical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain "All A are B" as "For all x, if x is A then x is B"; but in the nonclassical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where 'if ... then' is a special conditional not definable in terms of negation and disjunction or conjunction), this definition of restricted quantification fails to deliver important principles of restricted quantification that we'd expect. If we're going to use a nonclassical logic, we need one that handles restricted quantification better.
But even if one is suspicious of this in general, the principles that can be derived by applying (C) to the above principles seem highly compelling. For instance, by taking instances of (I) and (II), applying (C), and using the redundancy of double negation, one gets the following: I think these ought to be on our "wish list" even if (C) isn't assumed.
All of these laws are of course validated in classical logic, when restricted quantification is handled in the standard way. But in a "naive theory of truth" (to be defined in the next section) the logic can't be fully classical, and the challenge is to get a nonclassical logic that is both adequate to naive truth and that validates these laws. I'll also assume that 'if ... then' obeys modus ponens, and other obvious laws such as that from A and ¬B one can infer that it is not the case that if A then B. I also require that the logic allow reasoning by cases, taken to include ∃-Elimination as well as ∨-Elimination. And I'll assume that the logic includes substitutivity of identity and the standard structural rules, including the transitivity of consequence. (I don't mean to suggest that these assumptions are beyond discussion, but here is not the place.)
I assumed until recently that in order to maintain "naive truth" (to be explained shortly) I was going to have to qualify some of these laws slightly, so that the challenge would simply be to get a logic for naive truth that gave a pretty good approximation to these laws. That would be far more than one gets in extant theories of truth (including the theory in Field, 2008) . But to my surprise I discovered that it's possible to get all of the laws above (including (C)) to hold unrestrictedly in a naive theory of truth. 1 For handling vagueness as well as for handling truth, there is reason to take nonclassical logic seriously, and there's also reason to want the same laws of restricted quantification. It turns out that this is problematic there too: the nonclassical logics most often discussed for vagueness are (i) Kleene logics, which have no remotely reasonable notion of restricted quantification; and (ii) Lukasiewicz logics, which though coming a lot closer, do not validate all of the laws listed. (If one defines restricted quantification in them in the obvious way, as ∀x(Ax → Bx), then they fail to validate (I) and (I − ) and (I c ), (III), (III var ), (IV var ), and (VI), though (as we'll see in Section 12) they do obey laws which might perhaps be deemed "close enough approximations".) In any case, I've argued elsewhere (2003 and 2004) that the Lukasiewicz logics are simply inadequate for vagueness, for two reasons, the most serious of which is that they enable one to define a bivalent "super-determinateness" operator that obviates their whole point. The logic to be advocated below avoids both problems, as well as handling restricted quantification much better. So it's one that recommends itself for vagueness independently of issues about the semantic paradoxes; the fact that it handles the paradoxes too is an added plus for those who think a unified account is a good thing. But I will say little more about vagueness in this paper.
The motivation for trying to keep the above laws (together with other natural laws of restricted quantification that will emerge) isn't just that they "sound right". To those of us who are used to thinking in classical contexts, many things initially sound right that, once we take truth or vagueness seriously, are suspect except in restricted form. The motivation, rather, is that it is important to be able to reason with restricted quantifiers, and without laws that at the very least approximate these, our ability to so reason would be crippled. In Part 3 I will develop the logic of restricted quantifiers further than is required just to validate the laws above, in an effort to give initial plausibility to the idea that the construction yields a logic in which we could actually reason.
I by no means claim that the resulting logic is the best possible. Indeed, if one takes a "best possible" logic to be one whose connectives faithfully represent the connectives of natural language, the logic I will advocate is ruled out from the start. For though its conditional 'A → B' differs from the "material" conditional '¬A ∨ B' (as it must for 'A → A' to come out valid when '¬A ∨ A' isn't), still I've deliberately designed the '→' so that ' A → B' will reduce to '¬A ∨ B' in contexts where its antecedent and consequent behave classically. That guarantees that my logic will be subject to the oddities that the material conditional has in classical contexts: for instance, it will legitimize such bizarresounding claims as 'If I run for President in 2016, I'll win'. My account, then, is based on the fiction that the material account of the conditional is fine for conditionals whose antecedent and consequent behave classically. The reason I've based my account on this fiction is that I don't know the nonfiction: I know of no adequate account of how the 'if ... then' of English does behave, even when its antecedent and consequent are classical. If I had such an account, I'd probably have tried to generalize that ordinary conditional rather than the material conditional to nonclassical contexts, and then tried to show how to combine that generalized conditional with naive truth and restricted quantification. (Or perhaps I'd have tried to generalize both: the material conditional, after all, is what is of primary use within mathematics.) But I hope and expect that the methods used for combining naive truth and restricted quantification with a nonclassical generalization of the material conditional will prove helpful to the future project of combining naive truth and restricted quantification with a nonclassical generalization of the conditional of natural language. The aim of this paper is to make progress, not to provide the ultimately best possible theory. §2. Naive truth and satisfaction. By a naive truth theory, I mean a theory containing a truth predicate for its own sentences, in which a sentence attributing truth to a sentence in the language of the theory (that is unambiguous and free of indexical elements) is equivalent to the sentence itself, in the sense of being fully intersubstitutable with it (outside of quotation marks and other opaque constructions).
More exactly: when A and B are sentences, call A equivalent to B if, for any X and Y such that Y results from X by replacing an occurrence of A with B or vice versa (outside of opaque contexts), then Y is inferable from X and vice versa. (Obviously this suffices for multiple substitutions.) The naivety condition is that T rue( A ) is equivalent to A in this sense, where A is a standard name of A, taken to denote A "as a matter of logic". 2 For instance, in such a theory (i) If A and B are true then C is true will be inferable from (ii) If A and B then C, and vice versa, when A , B and C are (unambiguous etc.) sentences in the language of the theory. Informally, the idea is that it would be a mistake to believe (i) but not (ii), or vice versa.
Actually I require a bit more of a naive truth theory:
(1) I require that it contain a naive satisfaction predicate for its own formulas. That's a 2-place predicate meeting the following strengthened naivety condition: that for any formula A in the language with at most one free variable x, Satisfies(o, A(x) ) is intersubstitutable with A(x/o) . (I assume that the language contains an adequate means of coding finite sequences of objects with single objects (and then decoding them), in which case a satisfaction predicate for 1-place formulas suffices for a satisfaction predicate for formulas with arbitrarily many free variables.) From such a naive satisfaction predicate, a naive truth predicate is definable. 3 (2) I require that the theory validate some obvious composition principles, for example, that a conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true, or the analog of this for satisfaction. (Such principles are generalizations whose instances are already guaranteed by what was said above; but delivering the generalizations goes beyond delivering the instances.) (3) I require that certain schemas from the mathematics of the ground language hold even for instances containing new vocabulary such as 'True' and 'Satisfies'. I won't try here to say in general which such schemas should extend, but one that should is the induction rule A
(0), ∀n[A(n) ⊃ A(n + 1)] ∀n A(n). (Similarly when '⊃' is
replaced by any of the other conditionals I'll employ, such as '→'.)
But the challenge to providing an adequate naive theory depends little on these extra requirements. By and large, once one has a reasonable theory with a naive truth predicate, it's easy to extend it to include a naive satisfaction predicate, and to include the required composition principles, and to validate an extended induction rule. That will be so for the construction in this paper. Because of the possibility of "paradoxical sentences", for example, sentences asserting their own untruth, a naive truth theory is only possible in nonclassical logics. In particular, the logic in question (if it meets very minimal conditions) 4 must be either paraconsistent: it must allow acceptance of some sentences of form A ∧ ¬A; 5 or paracomplete: it must allow rejection of some sentences of form A ∨ ¬A.
(Rejection is to be taken as a state that precludes acceptance.) Paraconsistent logics with reasonable laws of conjunction will admit acceptance gluts, that is, they allow the simultaneous acceptance of both a sentence and its negation. So in these logics, accepting the negation of a sentence does not require rejecting the sentence, given that rejection precludes acceptance. Dually, paracomplete logics with reasonable laws of disjunction will admit rejection gluts, that is, the simultaneous rejection of both a sentence and its negation. So in them, rejecting a sentence does not require accepting its negation. (In particular, rejection of some instances of excluded middle doesn't require accepting the negations of those instances.) 6 The logic could be both paraconsistent and paracomplete, either (i) by allowing accepting both A and ¬A while simultaneously rejecting both B and ¬B for a B that differs from A, or (ii) by allowing for either accepting both A and ¬A or for rejecting them both (though of course, not doing both at once).
There should be no worry that the use of a nonclassical logic will upset standard mathematics, because we will be able to confine the nonclassicality so that it doesn't arise within standard mathematics. (We can use the truth or satisfaction predicate to extend standard mathematics, for example, by extending the induction rule; the extension will involve some nonclassicality, as it must to maintain naivety while avoiding paradox. But the unextended mathematics will be entirely classical, as indeed will large parts of the extension: each part of the standard Tarski hierarchy will be a classical fragment of the extended mathematics.)
The logic I will be suggesting in this paper is paracomplete but not paraconsistent: it permits rejection gluts but not acceptance gluts. As I'll note in the final section, the goal of maintaining the above menu of laws of restricted quantification is not achievable in a paraconsistent naive theory, and I'm skeptical that one can come satisfactorily close.
I take it that the idea of paracomplete logic for dealing with the semantic paradoxes is highly natural. Let Q abbreviate a Liar sentence, that is, a sentence asserting its own untruth, that is, a sentence equivalent to the claim ¬T rue( Q ) where Q is a term denoting Q. It's natural to think that it would be absurd to assert 6 Both sorts of logics allow both acceptance gaps and rejection gaps, but that has nothing special to do with these logics: any reasonable logic will allow for the nonacceptance of both 'This coin will land heads' and its negation, and also for the nonrejection of both. Many have tried to characterize paraconsistent and paracomplete approaches by saying that paraconsistent logics are those that allow for the acceptance of truth value gluts (sentences that are both true and false, where falsity is truth of negation) and that paracomplete logics are those that allow for the acceptance of truth value gaps (sentences that are neither true nor false). This misfires for a number of reasons.
(1) There are well-known truth theories in classical logic (hence not paracomplete) that accept truth value gaps; and duals to these, also in classical logic (and hence not paraconsistent), that accept truth value gluts. (Of course, neither of these can be naive truth theories, since no classical theory can be naive.) (2) In typical naive truth theories (those where ¬¬A is equivalent to A), there is no distinction between truth value gaps and truth value gluts: the "gap" statement ¬T rue( A ) ∧ ¬T rue( ¬ A ) is equivalent to ¬A ∧ ¬¬A, hence to ¬A ∧ A, hence to the "glut" statement
There is only a notion of a "gap/glut", which is as much one as the other.
Naive paracomplete theories (unless they are paraconsistent as well) do not accept truth value gaps (equivalently, truth value gluts), indeed they reject them. It is the issue of whether to accept gap/gluts or to reject them that differentiates the paraconsistent and paracomplete approaches.
To put the distinction in terms of the acceptance of truth value gluts versus the acceptance of truth value gaps is totally misguided.
the second conjunct seems to undermine the first. Similarly, it's natural to think that it's absurd to assert
again, the second conjunct seems to undermine the first. But in (i) the two conjuncts are equivalent; similarly in (ii), assuming the redundancy of double negation. Given this, it seems that each of
must be absurd, so we should fully reject them. This gives us a rejection glut. And with the further natural view, that if we fully reject each of two claims we should fully reject their disjunction, we get paracompleteness in the form I officially defined it. (Of course, committed proponents of alternative treatments of the paradoxes will reject some of the assumptions I've called "natural", but my goal is only to provide initial motivation for the approach I'll be taking.) It's well-known that no logic (meeting the assumptions of note 4) can accord with naive truth if it has a conditional that both obeys modus ponens and allows unrestricted conditional proof: that's the lesson of Curry's paradox. Since I'm keeping modus ponens without restriction, there will need to be restrictions on conditional proof; this will allow there to be valid rules A B for which the corresponding conditional is not valid. There will however be useful restricted versions of conditional proof; indeed, the natural way to establish the laws mentioned in Section I (which are all valid conditionals, not merely valid rules) will be by restricted conditional proof. §3. The restricted quantifier and the conditional. I'll use the notation ∀x(Ax/Bx) for "All A are B". But rather than taking this as a primitive binary quantifier, I'll take it to be defined from the ordinary universal quantifier and a conditional : ∀x(Ax/Bx) will abbreviate ∀x(Ax Bx). That this can be done isn't a substantive assumption: one could equally well take the restricted quantifier as primitive and define A B as ∀x (A/B) where x is a variable not occurring in either A or B. (Or if one doesn't like quantification by a variable not free in the formulas to which the quantifier is attached, define it as ∀x(x = x ∧ A /x = x ∧ B).) With only very minimal assumptions on how the conditional and the restricted quantifier behave, it's easy to see that whichever of the two one starts with, if one defines the other in terms of it as above and then does the reverse definition, then one gets something equivalent to what one started from. I prefer defining the restricted quantifier in terms of the conditional only because it makes the development to follow more perspicuous.
What would be a substantive assumption is that the conditional that's interdefinable with universal restricted quantification is the same conditional as the 'if ... then' that appears in proposed the laws of Section I. 7 In order to avoid such an assumption, let's use a different notation for the latter; I'll use →. It will turn out that there are reasons for taking the two conditionals to be distinct from each other, and also to be distinct from the conditional ⊃ defined by ¬A ∨ B. Nonetheless, we'll see that both these new conditionals are equivalent to ⊃ "in classical contexts", on a suitable explication of that phrase. As a very special case, when neither A nor B contains 'True' (and we don't allow for vagueness), any one of A → B, A B and A ⊃ B will be validly intersubstitutable with any other.
Given the definition of ∀x(Ax/Bx) in terms of , it's clear what's required of → and for the laws of Section 1 to be valid; it's that all instances of the following schemas be valid:
A look at (I-) makes clear why I wanted two separate conditionals: no naive truth theory satisfying my background conditions can have the analog of (I-) with both conditionals the same. (For any conditional , the alleged law [ (A B) ∧ A] B is called pseudo modus ponens for , and it is well known that we can't have both it and genuine modus ponens for (the rule of inference from A ∧ (A B) to B) without triviality, in a naive theory satisfying the conditions of note 4.) In order to have a chance of obtaining (I-) (in conjunction with modus ponens for ), the inference from A → B to A B must fail.
A look at the laws also reveals that unlike , we better not take → to be in general contraposable: we better not accept the inference from A → B to ¬B → ¬A in general, though it will be fine when A is classical. 8 Here, in sketch. are three routes to the conclusion that the general contraposability of → would cause difficulties:
(1) (Perhaps the most obvious, using (VI-):) Were it contraposable, one could get from (VI-) to (A B) → ¬(A ∧ ¬B), and in particular (A A) → ¬(A ∧ ¬A); hence assuming A A and modus ponens for →, we'd have ¬(A ∧ ¬A). But that is equivalent to excluded middle if we assume a deMorgan's law and the redundancy of double negation; so if we assume the latter laws, as I will, a logic without excluded middle that keeps (VI-) can't allow → to contrapose.
project, given that that project assumes an 'if...then' that reduces to the material conditional in classical contexts (see the end of Section 1); still, it might make the suggestion of an distinct from 'if ... then' seem less ad hoc. 8 It's perhaps worth noting that if we were engaged in giving a theory of the '→' that faithfully reflected the 'if...then' of English, we wouldn't want 'if ...then' to contrapose even in contexts where the antecedent and consequent are classical. (The noncontraposability of the English conditional is well-known: for example, from 'If Clinton won't be the next President, Bachmann won't either' I can't infer 'If Bachmann will be the next President, Clinton will too'.) As with the point made in the previous footnote, this is only indirectly relevant in the present context, but it doesn't seem entirely irrelevant.
(2) (Using (I-) and others instead of (VI-):) (II-) and (C-) lead to ¬A → (A B) , but this and (I-) will lead to [ A∧¬A] → B by laws we will surely want, which by contraposition of → would yield ¬B → ¬(A ∧ ¬A). So if B is absurd we'd get ¬(A ∧ ¬A) by modus ponens, which again leads to excluded middle by deMorgan's and double negation. (3) (Using (III-) and others, but not (I-) and only the rule form of (VI-):) Let be a logical truth. The rule form of (VI-) yields ¬( ¬ ). In the contraposed form of (III-), let A be and C be ¬ ; then applying modus ponens we get
. Using (V-) twice together with obvious laws of disjunction we get ¬B ∨ B.
(All the routes seem to require the deMorgan's law ¬(A ∧ B) | ¬ A ∨ ¬B, so I suppose one might try keeping contraposability and rejecting that; it isn't an option I've explored.)
Once we realize that the 'if ... then' may not be contraposable, the question arises as to which of the contrapositions of principles on our original list ought to hold. I think that there is a strong intuitive case for wanting the following additions to our list: 'm inclined to think that even (C) and (C*) together understate the intuitive requirements: we should have that "All A are B" and "All not B are not A " should be fully equivalent, that is, intersubstitutable in all contexts, even inside both sorts of conditionals.) My account will deliver all these things. 10 Although I prefer to define restricted quantification in terms of a contraposable , it is convenient to define that in turn from a noncontraposable conditional : A B will be 9 Note that (V*) entails (II c ). Similarly, the old (V) entails the following analog of (II c ):
10 One has two choices for a restricted existential quantifier "Some A are B": either ¬∀x(Ax/¬Bx) or ∃x(Ax ∧ Bx). Laws (V) and (V*) will be seen to entail that the first of these implies the second outside of contexts. I find the second ("weaker") reading of "Some A are B" far more natural, but to avoid any confusion, I'll avoid the locution "Some A are B" in this paper. There are also two choices for reading "No A are B", namely ∀x(Ax/¬Bx) or ¬∃x(Ax ∧ Bx).
In the case where Ax is "x = x ∧ Q" (where Q is the Liar sentence), the first makes "No A are A " and "No A are not A " fully acceptable; the latter doesn't, but doesn't make their negations acceptable either. I'm inclined to go for the latter reading here too, making "No A are B" the negation of "Some A are B" rather than the equivalent of "All A are not B"; but I'll also avoid the locution "No A are B" in what follows.
(A B) ∧ (¬B ¬A), making its contraposability evident. 11 But the main focus will be on rather than . How will the contraposable connect to ⊃? Letting mean validity (which won't be officially defined until Section 9, but I assume the reader to have a pretheoretic grasp of it), we will have the following:
Limited collapse:
Since → will obey modus ponens, we will also get weaker →-free forms of all these, for example,
The premise of (iv) (and its →-free weakening) is a slight strengthening of the claim that excluded middle holds either for A or for B. Such a premise is required, since we will want for instance Q Q but not Q ⊃ Q when Q is a Liar sentence. (We don't need excluded middle for both A and B.) It might seem tempting to summarize this limited collapse result by saying that A B is weaker than A ⊃ B, but equivalent to it on the strengthened excluded middle assumption. However, such a summary would be unfortunate, for the limited result tells us nothing about how the embeddings of A B and A ⊃ B inside the conditionals → and (or ) relate to each other. The equivalence of A and B, as defined in Section 2 in terms of intersubstitutivity, requires more than the validity of the biconditionals A ↔ B and ¬A ↔ ¬B. Rather, equivalence as there defined relates to the validity of a different biconditional ⇔, defined from → and together. Let A ⇒ B be short for → (A B) , where is any logical truth (e.g., ∀x(x = x)). ⇒ will be contraposable. 12 Let ⇔ be the corresponding biconditional, that is, (A ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A) ; then it will turn out that A is equivalent to B in the sense of valid intersubstitutability if and only if A ⇔ B.
Given this, it's natural to say that A is at least as strong as B if A ⇒ B; by contraposability, A is at least as strong as B only if ¬B is at least as strong as ¬A. Also, we can call A logically comparable to B if either A is at least as strong as B or B is at least as strong as A. On this definition, A B will turn out in general to be incomparable to A ⊃ B. Nonetheless, A B will reduce to A ⊃ B in suitably classical contexts: that is, they will turn out to be equivalent given the assumption of a strong form of excluded middle for both A and B. (Indeed, A B will reduce to A ⊃ B as well.)
We wouldn't expect a "Limited →-collapse" result analogous to the above, because of the noncontraposability of →. (But as mentioned, we do get a collapse result for →: it, like and , will reduce to ⊃ in classical contexts.) Still, we will get an analog of (ii) (and hence (ii w )) and of (iii w ): More on these matters in due course. §4. Validity, conservativeness, and general strategy. My concern is with getting a system of logic in which a great many laws involving truth, satisfaction, and the two conditionals are valid (i.e., have only valid instances; laws themselves I take as general schemas, showing valid logical forms). 13 A proper model-theoretic account of validity involves quantifying over models (of an appropriate sort) for a language that includes these notions: the inference from Γ to B is valid if for all models of such and such kind, .... It's important for any such definition that the class of models be fairly wide in order not to declare valid things that really hold only in the particular models looked at.
Some restrictions on the language are inevitable, since in order to sensibly talk of truth we need to presuppose a background theory of the bearers of truth, viz. sentences; and in order to sensibly talk of the satisfaction of formulas (with arbitrarily many free variables) by finite sequences, we must presuppose a background theory not only of formulas but of arbitrary finite sequences of the objects that the theory recognizes. Presumably this background theory is to be stated in the ground fragment of the language L, that is, the maximal fragment L 0 not containing 'True' or 'Satisfies' or the new conditionals. So in giving a model-theoretic account of validity for a language with 'True' or 'Satisfies' (and maybe the new conditionals), we must restrict attention to languages in whose ground fragments we can state the required background theory; I'll call such languages expressively adequate. Moreover, we must restrict attention to models whose ground fragments satisfy this background theory. It is common to take the background theory to explicitly include arithmetic, and to identify expressions of the language with numbers by a Gödel coding, though of course this is an inessential matter of convenience. I'll also assume that the models in question are ω ω ω-standard: when the background theory includes arithmetic, this means that the arithmetic part of the model is just the standard model of arithmetic. One rationale for requiring ω-standardness is that it guarantees that once we extend the model to cover a truth or satisfaction predicate, the rule of mathematical induction will apply even to formulas containing the new truth or satisfaction predicate. 14 By a minimally acceptable model of an expressively adequate language I'll mean an ω-standard model of it that satisfies the aforementioned background theory. (This is a requirement on the ground fragment only.)
To avoid notational complexity I'm going to restrict attention in the paper to languages that contain truth predicates but not satisfaction predicates. (So the languages won't be able to express the compositional laws for quantifiers.) This would be a serious limitation if there were any reason for the restriction beyond convenience and readability; but in fact it is routine if notationally messy to extend to satisfaction (and the compositional laws will then hold).
Here's an impressionistic sketch of the strategy to follow; it will be made more precise as I go on.
Let L be any expressively adequate language with 'True', ' ' and '→'. Part 2 of the paper will be concerned with showing how any minimally acceptable classical model M for its ground fragment can in a certain sense be "extended" to a multi-valued model (M) for all of L which (in a sense to be explained) validates the desired laws. The "extension" does not involve an extension of the domain: (M) will have exactly the same domain as M. Moreover, individual constants will name the same things in (M) as they do in M, and function symbols will stand for the same operations in (M) as in M. Furthermore, predicates in the ground language will behave in the same way in ( Call a set of sentences of the ground language *-consistent if there is a minimally acceptable classical model in which all its members are true. Since every model of form (M) will "validate" the desired laws (in the sense to be explained), and will also "validate" any sentence that gets value 1 M , it follows from (CNSV) that for every *-consistent set of sentences in the ground language, there is at least one nonclassical model which validates all its members and also validates the desired laws. Or as we could naturally put it:
(CONSERV): Any classically *-consistent set of sentences in the ground language is *-consistent in the desired logic.
I take that to be a desideratum of an adequate theory. 15 (We will actually be able to extend (CONSERV) in a useful way. For we will be able to define in the logic a predicate 'classical' such that when you add to any classical argument the additional premise that all the formulas in it are classical, the resulting argument is valid in the new logic. 16 Then the strengthened result is that if is a classically *-consistent set 15 Does this conflict with well-known results on the "nonconservativeness of truth" (reviewed in Halbach, 2011 and Horsten, 2011) ? The compositional laws will hold in the logic (or at least, they would if the construction were done with a satisfaction predicate, to allow the composition laws for the quantifiers to be expressed), and I've already noted that the rule of mathematical induction will extend to formulas containing 'True' and 'Satisfies'; in these circumstances, there's a sense in which the addition of 'True' or 'Satisfies' can't be a conservative extension. But what this means is simply that the analog of (CONSERV) with consistency instead of *-consistency can't hold. The nonconservativeness results depend on including models that are not ω-standard, and by moving to *-consistency I've excluded them. 16 'Classical' must be defined using 'True', and excluded middle does not apply to it; this is inevitable, for otherwise we could get a Liar-like paradox, from a sentence that asserts of itself that it is not both classical and true.
of sentences in the ground language, then augmented with the claim (CLASS) that all sentences in the ground language are classical is *-consistent in the new logic. So we can safely assume (CLASS) in the new logic, and when we do, all classical proofs in the ground language carry over to the new logic essentially unchanged.) It's clear that to carry out the strategy I've outlined, we must run the construction in such a way that it works for every minimally acceptable ground model. I will do so. 17 Since the construction will not depend on the details of the ground model, for much of the paper we will be able to hold that model fixed; but it is important to remember that it is really a construction for any ground model that meets the minimal presuppositions required for the notions employed (such as truth) to even make sense.
Part 2: THE CONSTRUCTION §5. Overview; valuations, and boosters. Let L be a language with 'True', '→' and ' ', whose ground fragment L 0 is expressively adequate for the syntax of L, and let M be any minimally adequate classical model of L 0 . (The terminology was defined early in Section 4.) The goal is to construct some sort of multi-valued model (M) based on M, in which sentences in the larger language L get values, and in which every sentence in the original language gets the same value it has in M. (I remind you that I'm sticking to 'True' rather than the more general 'Satisfies' only for notational convenience: the construction generalizes in a straightforward manner.)
To be more explicit, I'll take a classical model M for the ground fragment L 0 to consist of
• a nonempty domain;
• an assignment of an object in that domain to each individual constant, and of an n-ary operation on that domain to each n-ary function symbol; • an assignment of an n-ary 2-extension to each n-place predicate of the ground fragment, where by an n-ary 2-extension I mean an n-place function from the domain to the set {0,1}. (For classical models, value 1 corresponds to truth in the model, 0 to falsity in the model.) I'll also require that the 2-extension of '=', which presumably is in the language, be the function that maps each pair of form <o,o> into 1 and each other pair into 0.
An assignment function for a ground model M will be a function that assigns to each variable of the language an object in the domain of M.
We can think of the (M) to be constructed as based on an infinite set F M of "3-valued worlds", all of which are just like M as far as ground level formulas are concerned. (In particular, all have the same domain.) In calling a member of F M a "3-valued world", I mean that at it, each formula of the full language L is to get one of three values, relative to M and to any assignment function s. (Despite the "worlds" terminology, (On another matter, it makes no difference whether 'all formulas in it are classical' is formulated with a ⊃ or a , given Limited -collapse and the fact that 'x is a formula in argument a' is bivalent.) 17 Acceptable ground models for standard set theories like ZFC are of special interest, since the construction in this paper can be carried out in them; nonetheless it would be inappropriate to consider only such models, since that would blur the distinction between mathematics and logic by making every sentence of the set theory come out valid.
there isn't any real connection to necessity or possibility, just a formal analogy to modal semantics.) An important remark about the three values: I will call them 1, 0, and 1 2 , but you are not to think of them as meaning 'true (at the world)', 'false (at the world)' and 'neither (at the world)'. That can only lead to confusion. It's only slightly better to make the modelrelativity explicit, and speak of 'true at the world, in the model', etc.. Rather, the claim that a sentence has value 1 2 at a world of the model says nothing one way or the other about whether it is "true in the model at that world": all we can say is that the claim that it is true has value 1 2 at the world in the model. Any attempt to talk in a bivalent way about what's true at that world in the model will lead to all sorts of problems.
(M) itself is the product of the 3-valued worlds in F M : that is, in (M) the value of a formula A, relative to assignment function s, is the function that assigns to each world in F M the value in {0, 
there is a maximum value 1 M (the function that assigns 1 to every world in F M ) and a minimum value 0 M (defined analogously). A formula in the ground language that gets value 1 in M will get value 1 M in (M); similarly if it gets 0 in M it will get 0 M in (M). (When it comes to defining validity, I will use for each M an upwards-closed set of designated values that includes 1 M .) 18 Each "world" will be obtained from the classical starting model M by adding three things:
• a 3-extension T for 'True', where a 3-extension is a function from M to {0, For the moment, these will be arbitrary, though we'll eventually impose strong restrictions on which ones we consider. (In Section 6 we will choose, for each pair of g and v, a single 3-extension of 'True' to go with them. In Section 7 we will choose, for each g, a "fiber" R g of those v to consider in connection with g. And in Section 8 we will choose a set J of appropriate g. So the worlds we eventually get are determined by pairs < g, v > where g ∈ J and v ∈ R g ; for each choice of g and v there will be a uniquely determined T .)
The remaining task of this section is to give the valuation rules for arbitrary "3-valued worlds" (before the additional restrictions just mentioned are imposed). Basically these will be what's known as the Strong Kleene rules, but there will be one minor surprise in the differential treatment of v and g (which will explain why I'm calling one of them a 'valuation' and the other a 'prevaluation' or 'booster'.) Before turning to this, I'll make another notational simplification. I'll need to consider valuations of formulas relative to several parameters, and having additional subscripts for the assignment function would make for a very cumbersome notation. A common method for avoiding this, which I'll adopt, is to consider an expanded language L + M (possibly with a very large cardinality of symbols) with a name for every object in M, in which case one can treat quantification substitutionally. 19 (I'll usually just write 'L + ', leaving the subscript 'M' implicit.) This is a familiar device, but in the context of a truth theory, one must be careful to remember that the truth predicate we're investigating is the one for the unexpanded L, not L + -L + is simply a technical artifice, and one that depends on a specific choice of M. (Sentences of L + needn't even be in the domain of the model; and even if we think of the domain as never really including sentences themselves but only Gödel codes for them, the Gödel coding is for L rather than for L + ; L + might have too many names to be representable by any normal kind of Gödel coding.) So we need to carefully distinguish when we're talking about terms, formulas and sentences of L + and when we're talking about the more restricted class of terms, formulas and sentences of L. There are some obvious rules of thumb, 20 but I'll try to be explicit whenever there is any possibility of confusion.
Using this artifice, we can describe →-boosters and -valuations more simply than I did above. Instead of an →-booster or -valuation being a function that assigns values to pairs of assignment functions and L-formulas of conditional form, it is a function assigning values to L + -sentences of conditional form.
And now I give the valuation rules for arbitrary 3-worlds, based on the classical model M + of the ground fragment of the expanded ground language L + M . (For readability I will leave the model M + out of the notation, and when I do include it I will just call it M.)
• If p is a predicate of the ground language, | p(t 1 , ..., t n )| g,v,T is the result of applying || p|| (the 2-extension assigned to p)
[v is as yet undetermined; g and T drop out as irrelevant, as does any structure within A B]
Of course there's no loss in expressive power: for a formula A (of L or even L + ), |A| g,v,s is definable as |A * | g,v where A * is an L + −sentence that is just like A but with an L + -name for s(v) substituted for all free occurrences of v, for each v free in A. 20 (i) When I discuss the semantic value of an A relative to some parameters that don't include an assignment function, for example, by using a notation such as |A| g,v , the A involved will be assumed to be a sentence, and usually I'll allow it to be a sentence of L + rather than requiring it to be in L.
(ii) As a special case of (i), when I discuss the semantic value of something of form A(t) relative to some parameters that don't include an assignment function, for example, by using a notation such as |A(t)| g,v , the t involved will be assumed to be a closed singular term, and normally allowed to be in L + rather than requiring it to be in L.
(iii) When I say such things as "If t is a term that denotes B, then |T rue(t)| g,v is ....", B will normally be assumed to be a sentence of L, given that we're going to want 'True' to trivialize (always have value 0) in application to anything that isn't a sentence of L.
•
The definitions of ∨ and ∃ in terms of ¬, ∧ and ∀ yield analogs of the ∧ and ∀ clauses, with maximum instead of minimum. Using these rules, we determine a value |A| g,v,T for every sentence of the language L + on the basis of complexity. ( -sentences can be treated as of complexity 0, though they needn't be. →-sentences can't be: whether an →-conditional gets value 0 or 1 2 depends on prior values for its antecedent and consequent.)
It is evident that for each world z based on M, every L 0 -sentence gets value 1 in z if it is true in M, and 0 in z if it is false in M. (Similarly for L + 0 -sentences and M + .) So since (M) will be a product of worlds based in M, we have as promised that such ground sentences will always have value 1 M or 0 M , depending on whether they are true in M. §6. The Kripkean construction in this setting. The task of this section is to generate, for each →-booster g and -valuation v, a privileged 3-valued extension T g,v for 'True' which is "the appropriate one given g and v". I'll use Kripke's minimal fixed point construction. (It isn't really essential to stick to the minimal fixed point, but for convenience I will.) The only novelty, and it's slight, is that the construction will be given in the context provided in the last section, where the values for →-conditionals vary and yet do not reduce to ⊃. It is only because of special features of the rules for →-conditionals that this will work.
The construction proceeds in stages: for each ordinal σ, we define a 3-valued extension T g,v,σ for 'True' as follows: Following Kripke, we show by induction on complexity that (*): for any L + -sentence A and any g and v, if τ < σ and |A| g,v;τ is 1 or 0 then
Obviously the presence of the doesn't interfere with this, since L + -sentences of form B C don't change in value as σ increases. What about sentences of form B → C? They clearly never change in value from 1 to anything else as σ increases. And the value of B → C could only change from 0 to anything else if the value of B changed from 1 to something else or the value of C changed from 0 to something else; that is, a violation of (*) when A is of form B → C would require a violation for one of the less complex sentences B and C. So the induction on complexity still goes through.
Once (*) is established, the 1 and 0 clauses for 'True' can be simplified to simple existential quantifications: if o is (the Gödel number of) the L-sentence B then
1 2 otherwise (I didn't write them that way at the start because there would be an apparent danger of assigning to T g,v,σ (o) both 1 and 0.) So if t denotes the L-sentence B then |True(t)| g,v,σ is 1 iff (∃τ < σ)(|B |g,v;τ = 1), and 0 iff (∃τ < σ) (|B| g,v;τ 
Moreover, cardinality considerations show that there is an ordinal after which further increase in σ makes no difference. (That "closure ordinal" may depend on g and v, as well as on the underlying model M.) The desired T g,v ("the minimal fixed point") is the one for such sufficiently large σ. For any L + -sentence B, we take |B| g,v to simply be the value generated by this fixed point 3-extension for 'True'.
The fixed point property gives us that for any g and (The t needn't be in L as opposed to L + , but typically for any sentence in L there will be closed terms in L that denote it, and (K) applies to them. Also in connection with the quantifier rules, (K) delivers what we desire: if A(x) is a formula satisfied only by the L-
Is this enough to ensure naive truth as defined in Section 2? No. Naivety requires that if t is an L + -term that denotes L-sentence A, and Y is an L + -sentence that results from L + -sentence X by replacing an occurrence of A with T rue(t) or vice versa, then |Y | g,v = |X | g,v . (K) together with the strong Kleene rules ensures this if the substitution of A with T rue(t) is not in the scope of any conditional; but that isn't enough for naivety.
To get the more general intersubstitutivity that naivety requires, we need an assumption about g and v. What we need is that they are transparent. For v to be transparent requires that Whenever t is a closed L + -term that denotes an L-sentence B, and Y is a sentence that results from the sentence X by replacing an occurrence of B with T rue(t) or vice versa,
For g to be transparent is analogous. Then using (K), an easy induction yields:
(Transparency). If g and v are transparent then for any L-sentence B and any L + -term t that denotes it, if Y results from X by replacing an occurrence of B with True(t) or vice versa, then |Y |
From this it is clear that all we need to do to ensure that our construction yields naive truth is to ensure that the g and v we construct are transparent.
We're going to need one other lemma about the micro-constructions. If v and w arevaluations, let v ≤ K w mean that for any sentences A and B) . Define ≤ K for →-boosters similarly (though the case where g(A → B) is 0 doesn't arise). Proof. By an obvious induction on the stages in a Kripke construction, with a subinduction on complexity. More fully, suppose v ≤ K w. It suffices to show that for all σ and all A,
In the induction, we assume that (I τ,B ) holds for every <τ,B> where τ < σ, and also when τ=σ and B is a subformula of A (counting each B(t) as a subformula of ∀x Bx). [There's no need to count B and C as subformulas of B C, though no harm in doing so; but it's essential to count them as subformulas of B → C.] Given this assumption, we must show that (I σ,A ). This is straightforward. (In the case where A is of form T rue(t) where t denotes a sentence B that may be of high complexity, we use the inductive assumption that for any τ < σ, (I τ,B ) holds for all B. In the other cases we use that (I σ,B ) holds for B of lower complexity than A, together with the supposition that v ≤ K w. Details in footnote.) 21 §7. Fibers. The goal of this section is to construct, for each →-booster g based on M, a set R M,g of -valuations (think of them as the fairly "regular" ones), and a certain privileged member v g of that set. For each fixed g based on M, I'll let F M,g be {< g, v >: v ∈ R M,g }, and call it "the fiber attached to g"; < g, v g > will be called the "base point of the fiber".
To complete the geometric analogy, in the next section I will construct a certain "base space" J M of "regular" →-boosters g, with a privileged one @. The set F M of "worlds" will then be the set of worlds in fibers attached to the base space: that is, {R M,g |g ∈ J M }. So the value space V M for the multi-valued model (M) will be a set of functions from this to {0, to drop the subscript 'M' for now, but it's important to remember that the fiber space, and the value space formed from it, depend on M. Everything here is model-relative; the construction will give no sense to any model-independent notion of a sentence's value. The constructions of the fibers and of the base space are fixed point constructions, and they are extremely similar. In this section we see how it works for fibers.
Let a -chain be a set Z of nonempty sets of transparent -valuations such that if S 1 , S 2 ∈ Z then either S 1 ⊆ S 2 or S 2 ⊆ S 1 .
Let g be any transparent →-booster; it will be held fixed throughout the construction of the fiber. (There are plenty of transparent →-boosters: a trivial example is one that assigns 1 2 to every →-conditional, and far more interesting ones will be constructed in Section 8.)
Given any such Z and g, let val g [Z ] be the -valuation given by
This is a legitimate definition: nothing can be assigned both 1 and 0 since if a chain contains both S 1 and S 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 can't be empty since it must be either S 1 or S 2 , which were required to be nonempty. 
(Only small sets matter, and the smaller the sets in a chain the bigger the chain. Clearly if Z 1 ⊆ Z 2 then Z 1 ≤ Z 2 . ≤ is a preorder, that is, reflexive and transitive.) So:
Observation on Monotonicity for -chains
]. (≤ K was defined near the end of the previous section, just prior to the KMonotonicity Lemma.)
is 1 then for some S 1 ∈ Z 1 , (∀w ∈ S 1 )(if A| g,w = 1 then |B| g,w = 1); and so any subset S 2 of S 1 has this property too; and some such subset is in Z 2 . So the 1 clause for Z 1 guarantees the 1 clause for Z 2 . The 0 clause is analogous.
Truncation Corollary for -chains If S is a member of the -chain
Proof. By definition, both Z S ≤ Z and Z ≤ Z S . [The first is immediate from the fact that Z S ⊆ Z . For the second: Suppose S´∈ Z . then (since S ∈ Z ) either S´⊆ S or S ⊆ S´; in the first case S´is itself in Z S , in the second case it has a subset that is.] But then the Observation gives that val g [Z S ] and val g [Z ] each extend the other in the ≤ K -order, which means that they are the same.
For each g, I inductively define a sequence of sets R g,μ of transparent -valuations, as follows. (Think of R g,μ as the set of valuations that are "regular to level μ, relative to g".) Let DEFINITION 7.2. R g,μ = {val g [Z ] : Z is a -chain and (∀ξ < μ)(∃S ∈ Z )(S ⊆ R g,ξ )}.
Note that if κ < μ then R g,μ ⊆ R g,κ ; and that all members of any R g,μ are transparent. 22 The definition doesn't really require that Z be a chain, simply that it be a collection of nonempty sets of transparent valuations such that any two members of Z have a common subset in Z . This is relevant to giving a more natural semantics in the case of vagueness, but for simplicity I'll confine myself here to chains.
LEMMA 7.3 (Nontriviality of fiber-stages). For all g and μ, R g,μ = ∅; indeed, for all g and μ, R g,μ has a member v g,μ such that (∀w ∈ R g,μ )(v g,μ ≤ K w).
Proof. Suppose that for all κ<μ, R g,κ = ∅. Then the set Z g,μ = df {R g,κ : κ<μ} is a -chain that trivially meets the conditions in the definition of R g,μ ; so letting
Moreover, if Z is any -chain for which (∀ξ < μ)(∃S ∈ Z )(S ⊆ R g,ξ ), Z g,μ ≤ Z , so by the Observation on Monotonicity for -chains,
. So by definition of R g,μ , v g,μ is its minimum member in the ≤ K ordering. THEOREM 7.4 (Fixed points in fiber-construction). Proof.
(i) By a standard fixed point argument, 23 together with the observation that if R g were empty then the R g,μ it is equal to would have to be as well, in violation of the lemma. (ii) Suppose v ∈ R g and R g = R g,μ . Then v ∈ R g,μ+1 , so there is a -chain Z that includes at least one subset S of R g,μ (i.e., of R g ) such that v = val g [Z ] ; but then the truncation Z S consists entirely of members of R g , and by the Truncation
and Z is a chain of subsets of R g , v clearly satisfies the requirement for being in each R g,μ and hence in R g .) (iii) {R g } ≤ Z for all Z ∈ Z g , so the minimality of v g follows from the observation on monotonicity.
For each v ∈ R g , v is val g [Z ] for at least one Z ∈ Z g ; pick one and call it Z g,v . Then given (ii) of the Fixed Point Corollary, we have in effect a modal-like neighborhood semantics in each fiber, with the valuations in R g as "worlds": for each world w, the "w-neighborhoods" are the members of Z g,w (or the supersets of such members, depending on how you use the term 'neighborhood'). For v g the sole neighborhood is R g ; but typical "worlds" within this neighborhood have much smaller neighborhoods, to which those worlds needn't belong. (In the construction as I've done it, the neighborhoods of each world are nested, but as remarked in note 22, this is not essential to the construction.)
23 Details: Let R g be the intersection of all the R g,κ . Trivially, for every κ, R g ⊆ R g,κ ; we need that for all sufficiently large κ the reverse inclusion holds. If c is the cardinality of the ground model M (and hence of L + ) then (since 3 c = 2 c ) there are only 2 c -valuations; so there must be an ordinal μ with at most 2 c predecessors such that for every -
. Since the sequence of R g,κ is a chain, it follows that for every v, if v / ∈ R g , then v / ∈ R g,μ , and indeed that for every κ ≥ μ, v / ∈ R g,κ .
It's worth making explicit the values that result. In general,
1 2 otherwise Defining from as in Section 3, |A B| g,v has the same 0 clause, but is 1 iff (∃S ∈ Z g,v )(∀w ∈ S)(|A| g,w ≤ |B| g,w ).
In particular, since Z g,v g is {R g },
1 2 otherwise; and
Also, since the w in R g are precisely the valuations of form val g [Z ] where Z is a chain of members of R g , we also have The following result will prove central:
THEOREM 7.5 (Regularity for fibers). For any L + sentence A and any g, |A| g,v g = 1 iff (∀w ∈ R g )(|A| g,w = 1), and |A| g,v g = 0 iff (∀w ∈ R g )(|A| g,w = 0).
Proof. The right to left of each 'iff' is trivial, and the left to right holds by virtue of the minimality of v g ((iii) of the Fixed Point Theorem) together with the K-Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 6.2).
This means that a great deal about the fiber at g is determined from its base point < g, v g >.
From now on I'll use |A| g as an abbreviation for |A| g,v g . COROLLARY 7.6 (to Regularity Theorem). and for all v in R g |A| g,v < 1.)
Proof. (a) If |A| g = 1 then by the Regularity Theorem, (∀w R g )(|A| g,w = 1); so from (*) and (**) above, |A B| g and |A B| g are each 1 iff (∀w ∈ R g )(|B| g,w = 1), and 0 iff (∀w ∈ R g )(|B| g,w = 0). But by Regularity again, that means |A B| g = 1 iff |B| g = 1, and similarly for 0; which implies that the same holds for Proof.
And if |A| g = 1 and |B| g = 0, then for all v in R g , |A| g,v = 1 and |B| g,v = 0, so |A B| g,v = |A B| g,v = |A ⊃ B| g,v = 0. §8. The base space. The construction of the base space has some analogy to the construction of the fibers. But instead of relativizing the construction to a given -valuation v (which would be the analog of what we did with the fibers), we make use of the prior construction of a privileged v for each g, viz. the base point v g . We also make modifications reflecting the fact that our →-boosters are only two-valued.
Let an →-chain be a set P of nonempty sets of transparent →-boosters such that if
Again, let |A| g abbreviate |A| g,v g . Let boost[P] be the →-booster given by
1 2 otherwise Obviously since all members of P and all valuations of form v g are transparent then boost[P] is transparent.
In analogy to the fiber-construction: If P 1 and P 2 are →-chains, let P 1 ≤ P 2 mean: (∀G 1 ∈ P 1 )(∃G 2 ∈ P 2 )(G 2 ⊆ G 1 ). (Again, only small sets matter, and the smaller the sets in a chain the bigger the chain. If P 1 ⊆ P 2 then P 1 ≤ P 2 .) So:
Observation on Monotonicity for →-chains
[This now means only that the relation assigned by P 1 is a subset of that assigned by P 2 .]
; and so any subset G 2 of G 1 has this property too; and some such subset is in P 2 .
Truncation Corollary for →-chains If G is a member of the
Proof. Analogous to the proof for fibers.
I inductively define a sequence of sets J α of transparent →-boosters, as follows. (Think of J α as the set of boosters that are "regular to level α".) Let DEFINITION 8.2. J α = {boost [P] : P is a →-chain and (∀γ < α)(∃G ∈ P)(G ⊆ J γ )}.
Clearly if β<α then J α ⊆J β ; and all members of any J α are transparent.
LEMMA 8.3 (Nontriviality of base stages).
For all α, J α = ∅; indeed, for all α, J α has a member g α such that (∀h ∈ J α )(g α ≤ K h).
Proof. Suppose that for all β<α, J β =∅. Then the set P α = d f {J β : β<α} is an →-chain that trivially meets the conditions in the definition of J α ; so letting g α = d f boost[P α ], we have g α ∈J α . Moreover, if P is any →-chain for which (∀γ < α)(∃G ∈ P)(G ⊆ J γ ), then P α ≤ P, so by the Observation on Monotonicity for →-chains, boost[P α ] ≤ K boost [P] , that is, g α ≤ K boost [P] . So since J α is the set of members of form boost[P] where (∀γ < α)(∃G ∈ P)(G ⊆ J γ ), g α is its minimum member in the ≤ K ordering.
THEOREM 8.4 (Fixed point of base construction).
(i) There is a nonempty set J (the set of "regular" →-boosters) such that for all sufficiently large α, J α = J.
(ii) Letting P be the set of J-chains, that is, nonempty →-chains of subsets of J, then (FP) J = {boost[P] : P ∈ P}. (iii) J has a minimal member @ in the ordering ≤ K , and it is just boost[{J}], that is, it is boost[P] for the chain with J as its sole member.
Proof.
(i) As for the fiber construction.
(ii) As for the fiber construction, but to repeat: Suppose h ∈ J and J = J α . Then h ∈J α+1 , so there is an →-chain P that includes at least one subset G of J α (i.e., of J ) such that h = boost[P]; but then the truncation P G consists entirely of members of J and by the Truncation Corollary,
and P is a chain of subsets of J , h clearly satisfies the requirement for being in each J α and hence in J.) (iii) {J} ≤ P for all P ∈ P, so the minimality of @ follows from the observation on monotonicity.
For each g ∈ J , g is boost[P] for some P ∈ P; pick one and call it P g . As with the fibers, (ii) of the Fixed Point Corollary means that we have in effect a modal-like neighborhood semantics on the base space, with the boosters in J as "worlds": for each world g the g-neighborhoods are the members of P g (or their supersets). For @ the sole neighborhood is J; but typical "worlds" within this neighborhood have much smaller neighborhoods, to which those worlds needn't belong.
The values that result will of course not be completely analogous to those in the fiber case. In general,
2 otherwise (I'm using g (A, B) as an alternative notation for g (A → B) , to lessen the possibility of confusion with the value of A → B at g.) And so Call g reflexive if g is in every member of P g . In the case where g is reflexive and in addition v = v g , the 0 clause simplifies to |A| g,v = 1 ∧ |B| g,v = 0. In particular, since not only is @ reflexive but P @ is {J}, (2) says that "modus ponens for → holds at the principal base node < @, v @ >".
A very important difference between this base construction and the fiber construction is that we do not have a "Regularity Theorem" for the Base Space. (For two reasons. First, when g ≤ K h, there's no guarantee that even for the same v, |A| g,v ≤ K |A| h,v : if g(B → C) < 1 and h(B → C) = 1, and |B| g,v = |B| h,v = 1 and |C| g,v = |C| h,v = 0, then |B → C| g,v will be 0 and |B → C| h,v will be 1. Second, we'd need in any case that |A| g,v g ≤ K |A| h,v h , and there's no way to get from g
Not only does the proof fail, it is easy to construct counterexamples, based either on embeddings of → inside or on embeddings of truth claims that "depend on" → inside . To begin with (this isn't the counterexample), let K be a standard Curry sentence for →, constructed by the usual methods to be equivalent to T rue( K ) → ⊥, where ⊥ is ¬ (i.e., ¬∀x(x = x)). By transparency, K must be equivalent to K → ⊥. g(K → ⊥) is 1 at those g for which there's a G in P g throughout which K has value less than 1, and 1 2 otherwise; |K → ⊥| g , which is |K | g , must be the same since the assumption that it was 0 would lead to contradiction. Since @ ∈ P @ , |K | g must have value 1 2 when g is @, and must have value 1 for some other g ∈ J.
Now let K * be the sentence K ¬K . At those g for which |K | g = 1, |K * | g,v is 0 for any v in R g ; and at those g for which |K | g < 1, |K * | g,v is 1 for any v in R g . This is obviously a counterexample to "Base-Regularity": K * has value 1 at the principal node < @, v @ >, but has value 0 at many other base nodes.
Indeed it is an especially interesting example, in that it's a sentence for which excluded middle holds at every node (so → (K * ∨ ¬K * ) holds at every node), and yet unlike the sentences in the ground model it varies in value from node to node, even base node to base node (so neither → K * nor → ¬K * holds at the principal base node). I take it that we should not count such sentences as "behaving classically", so the example illustrates that in this theory obeying excluded middle does not suffice for behaving classically. What does suffice is obeying the law ( → A) ∨ ( → ¬A), which we might call strong excluded middle; 24 more on this in the next section. 24 So one way to define the classicality predicate mentioned near the end of Section 4 is as 'T rue(F(x)) ∨ ¬T rue(F(x))', where 'F(x)' denotes the result of prefixing x with ' →'. So defined, the classicality predicate is highly nonbivalent: while it's value is 1 when applied to formulas for which the claim of strong excluded middle has value 1, it's value is 1 2 rather than 0 for every other formula. One can get predicates that are closer to bivalent by employing iterations of a determinately operator, which can be defined using '→' in the manner given in Field (2008) . (Transfinite iterations are also definable, using 'True' in the limit stages.) The more times one iterates 'determinately' in the definition, the closer to bivalence one gets. But one can never get a fully bivalent classicality predicate in this manner; which is good, since otherwise a sentence that asserts of itself that it is not both classical and true would be paradoxical even within the logic. For any assignment function s for M, let's say that a formula A of the full language L is <M, s>-designated if in M relative to s, its value at the principal base node is 1. Equivalently, if its value is 1 throughout the principal fiber {< @, v >: v ∈ R M,@ }.
Call a formula <M, s>-super-designated if its value (relative to M and s) is 1 at all nodes (equivalently, all base nodes). While for a wide class of sentences designatedness requires super-designatedness, the example of K * from the last section shows that this is not invariably so.
For sentences we can simply speak of M-designatedness and M-superdesignatedness, since the assignment function doesn't matter.
It might seem natural to base a model-theoretic explication of validity on the notion of super-designatedness: e.g. to regard a sentence as valid if and only if for every model M it comes out super-designated, and to regard an inference between sentences as valid if and only if for every model where the premises are super-designated, so is the conclusion. But I think this would have a high cost: reasoning by cases would not come out as an acceptable meta-rule. Indeed we'd have cases where a disjunction was counted "valid" even though each disjunct implied absurdities. We can see this from the example of K * at the end of the previous section. K * ∨ ¬K * is super-designated in each model. But in no model is either K * or its negation super-designated; so the inference from K * to any absurdity one chooses would come out vacuously valid, and similarly for the inference from ¬K * to the same absurdity. I think we should be deeply dissatisfied with any account on which a disjunction of two claims comes out logically true and yet each of the disjuncts logically implies that I'm a cheese sandwich.
Designatedness does not have the problem: there are models in which K * is designated (indeed, every model has this feature), so on the definition of validity (and implication) I'm about to give, K * does not imply that I'm a cheese sandwich (indeed it doesn't imply anything that isn't itself designated).
DEFINITION 9.1. If is a set of formulas of L, and B a formula of L, call the inference from to B model-theoretically valid, and write B, if for every minimally adequate classical model M of the ground fragment L 0 of L, and every assignment function s for M, if all members of are <M, s>-designated then B is <M, s>-designated. (I'll take " model-theoretically implies B" to be another way of saying that the inference from to B is model-theoretically valid.)
For present purposes I propose to take model-theoretic validity, so defined, as an explication of validity (for quantificational languages with 'True' and the two conditionals). 25 My primary interest will be in proving that all inferences of certain forms are (modeltheoretically) valid: those forms are valid schemas, or laws. 
. This is the notion whose properties I will primarily be investigating. Usually I'll drop the subscript 'M'. This is potentially dangerous, since it might lead us to forget that we're working with a model-dependent notion rather than full model-theoretic validity; but I think I've stressed the distinction enough to make the risk minimal.
set of formulas, the set of formulas B that validly follow from it should also be recursively enumerable. Model-theoretical validity as defined above won't satisfy that: indeed, any hope for that was given up from the start, when I restricted to minimally adequate classical models (which, you'll recall, were required to be ω-models). But even if, like me, you prefer a computationally tractable validity relation, the notion of model-theoretic validity as defined above is highly relevant for the purposes of this paper. For the question of this paper is: (Q): Can we have a logic with naive truth and reasonable laws, including reasonable laws of restricted quantification?
The logic needs to be strong enough so as to include the laws we want (e.g., of naive truth and restricted quantification). It also needs to not be so strong as to declare valid any inferences we strongly want not to be valid. For instance, we certainly don't want the inference from my living in New York to the defeat of the Paris Commune to turn out valid; the conservativeness criterion of Section 4 was imposed precisely so as to guarantee against such an extreme sort of excess strength.
My view is that model-theoretic validity, in the sense defined above, is highly relevant to (Q). What I ultimately want is an axiomatic system, consisting of axioms positing some basic validities together with rules of validity-preservation. As long as (R): The axioms declare valid only inferences that are model-theoretically valid, and the rules are ones that preserve model-theoretic validity, then any theorem of such a system will declare valid only inferences that are model-theoretically valid, and so the conservativeness criterion will be met. In short, we are free to choose whatever basic validities and rules of validity-preservation we like, provided that condition (R) is met. What is relevant to this paper is only that the inferences we care about are available to be chosen, that is, are model-theoretically valid. How precisely to decide on which of the other model-theoretic validities should count as genuine logical validities (rather than, for example, as mathematical truths) needn't here concern us. It is easily seen that both modus ponens for and modus ponens for → are valid (M-valid for each M), in the sense of (M-)validity I've defined. I remarked before that in any naive truth theory meeting extremely minimal conditions, we can't have conditionals that obey both modus ponens and unrestricted conditional proof. Indeed, Curry's paradox shows that modus ponens requires failure of conditional proof even in the special case when there are no side premises (or none beyond the arithmetic used to construct self-referential sentences). But there are nonetheless limited versions of conditional proof that hold.
In the case of →-Introduction, I introduce the notion of universal validity (and universal M-validity) Even for 0-premise inferences (i.e., formulas), universal validity is stronger than validity, because of the lack of a regularity theorem on the base space. (In the special case of →-conditionals, validity implies universal validity.) For B to be universally valid (in a given M) is for → B to be valid (in that M). While we don't have B → B (consider K * from the previous section), we do have that if B is universally valid so is → B (and hence that → B → ( → B)). The following meta-theorem (which holds relative to any M, as well as generally) is trivial, but worth stating since it will be the standard way of proving the validity of →-conditionals.
PROPOSITION 9.2 (Limited →-Introduction).
(1) If B univ Proof.
(1) is a special case of (2), so let's just prove the latter. Consider any g ∈ J for which | → | g = 1. Then for every A i in there is a G i in P g such that (∀h ∈ G i )(|A i | h = 1); the G i form a finite subchain of P g , so there is a smallest one, call it G. It's in P g , and (∀h ∈ G)(| | h = 1). But if |B → C| g < 1, then since G ∈ P g , there must be an h ∈ G such that |B| h = 1 and |C| h < 1. Since also | | h = 1, it can't be the case that , B univ C.
The 'if ... then' in the nonparenthetical parts of (1) and (2) can in fact be replaced by 'if and only if'. 26 One can not generalize (1) to include side formulas, that is, we do not have that if
Example: For any A and C, A, ¬A univ C (since there are no g where |A| g and |¬ A| g are both 1); so the purported generalization would require that for all A and C, 26 Suppose that not( , B univ C); then for some h ∈ J , | | h = |B| h = 1 and |C| h < 1. {{h}} is an →-chain; let g be the →-booster it generates. Then | → | g = 1 and |B → C| g < 1.
A ¬A → C. But let A be the sentence K * from the end of Section 8, and C be ⊥. |K * | @ = 1, but there are g ∈J for which |¬K * | g = 1, so |¬K * → ⊥| @ isn't 1 (indeed, is 1/2).
Might what I'm calling universal validity better be called validity (and what I'm calling validity be called sub-validity)? The Limited →-Introduction Theorem shows that this would have the advantage of yielding conditional proof in the case where there are no side formulas. Inevitably, this would mean that restrictions would be required on modus ponens. I'll give two examples.
Example I: Let A be K , the Curry sentence for →, discussed in the previous section (and used in the definition of K * ), and B be ⊥. As observed earlier, there are base nodes g at which K has value 1; and since it's equivalent to K → ⊥, both K and K → ⊥ have value 1 at such g, even though ⊥ obviously doesn't. Example II: Let A be K * and B be ⊥. Let h be any world where K is 1; then |K * | h = 0.
Let g be boost({{h}}). By the valuation rules, |K → ⊥| g is 0 and |K * → ⊥| g = 1. But the first means that |K | g is 0 and hence |K * | g is also 1.
In both these examples, there are nodes where A and A → B have value 1 and B not only has value less than 1, it has value 0. That means that these examples show not only that modus ponens for → is not universally valid, but also that the rule
Contra-MP: A, ¬B ¬(A → B)
is not universally valid. (Both this rule and modus ponens do preserve universal validity, but that is much weaker. 27 )
Is the fact that these rules are not universally valid a decisive reason for using the term 'valid' as I have, rather than for universal validity? Perhaps not: it might be thought worthwhile to restrict modus ponens and Contra-MP a bit to get more conditional proof. That would still be congenial to the aims of this paper. For since the target laws from Sections 1 and 3 are all →-conditionals, their validity implies their universally validity; using universal validity as the explication of 'valid' would still lead to a vindication of the restricted quantifier laws, though in a slightly different overall logic. (Similarly, if anyone is unconvinced that reasoning by cases should be a desideratum and thinks that validity should involve the preservation of super-designatedness, it shouldn't matter: since the target laws from Sections 1 and 3 are all 0-premise inferences, their universal validity means that they preserve super-designatedness. All three notions of validity coincide in the case of the validity of →-conditionals.)
Another technically useful notion is super-validity: (***): M,super B if and only if for every <g, v> in 27 We don't even have the meta-rule that if univ B and univ B → C then univ C, when = ∅. Taking to be {B}, that would yield the meta-rule that if B univ B → C then B univ C; taking B to be K and C to be ⊥, we see that this fails. (We do have that if univ B → C then B univ C: that's the converse of (1), proved in the previous footnote.) Similarly, we don't even have the meta-rule that if univ B and univ ¬C then univ ¬(B → C), when = ∅. Taking to be {B}, that would yield the meta-rule that if B univ ¬C then B univ ¬(B → C); taking B and C both to be the Liar sentence, we see that this fails. 
Incidentally, not only does B ⇒ nc C imply B C (as is immediate from its definition, given modus ponens for →), it implies B → C as well (indeed universally): for when
We also have a notion of principal-fiber-validity:
(****):
In disanalogy to the case of universal validity, this coincides with ordinary validity when = ∅, by the Regularity Theorem for fibers. For this notion, we have the following (which also holds relative to any M, as well as generally): Proof. (Obviously the second follows from the first.) Suppose that |B C| @ < 1. Then there is a v 1 ∈ R @ for which |B| @,v 1 = 1 and |C| @,v 1 < 1. Suppose also that | | @ = 1. Then by the Regularity Theorem on fibers, | | @,v 1 = 1. So the inference from and B to C isn't pf-valid.
In another disanalogy to the case of universal validity, one cannot strengthen the conclusions to p f claims (except when = ∅; but since pf-validity coincides with validity in that case, this is of no interest).
Example: Since obviously A, p f A, the proposed strengthening would require A p f A. But while the weaker A A is guaranteed by the above, A p f A has many counterexamples. For instance, take A to be the " -Curry" K # , constructed so as to be equivalent to T rue( K # ) ⊥ and therefore to K # ⊥. For any fiber g including @, |K # | g,v g must be .] Since it isn't 1 and is equivalent to |K # ⊥| g,v g , there must be a v in R g where |K # | g,v = 1. This requires that for some S in Z g,v , (∀w ∈ S)(|K # | g,w < 1); and that requires that
I turn now to structural rules, reasoning by cases, and the collapse of both conditionals to ⊃ in classical contexts.
Structural Rules: It is immediate from the definitions that the usual structural rules hold for validity and all its strengthenings (universal validity, pf-validity and super-validity).
That is, for each notion we have both And since I've defined B for the case where is a set (rather than a sequence) of premises, structural permutation and structural contraction are automatic. I will implicitly appeal to all these structural rules in what follows, without special note.
Reasoning by cases: For each of these validity notions, we have reasoning by cases even with side formulas, both in the ∨-form and the ∃-form.
That is, For instance, the only way we could have a failure of , A ∨ B univ C is for there to be a model M and a g in
, so at least one of , A C and , B C must fail.
Finally we can state a classical collapse result for all our conditionals:
Classical collapse: All conditionals are equivalent to ⊃ in classical contexts, that is, on the assumption of strong excluded middle for their antecedents and consequents.
That is,
, and similarly for ; and
. But then by Regularity for fibers, either (∀h ∈ J)(∀w ∈ R h )(|A| h,w = 1) or (∀h ∈ J)(∀w ∈ R h )(|A |h,w = 0). Similarly for B. It clearly follows that
Note that since (1) is universal, it generates the valid→-conditional [(
Especially in the case of (1), there are related results that derive weaker equivalences from weaker premises (also in universal fashion, so that we get valid →-conditionals from them). For instance
Proof. (1a) If the premise has value 1 at g then for some G in P g and all h in G, either (i) |A| h = 0 or |B| h = 1, or (ii) |A| h = 1 and |B| h < 1, or (iii) |B| h = 0 and |A| h = 1 2 . In case (i), regularity gives that either |A| h,w is 0 for all w in R h or |B| h is 1 for all w in R h , in which case clearly |A B| h and |A ⊃ B| h are both 1. In case (ii), regularity gives that |A| h,w is 1 for all w in R h , and that if |B| h is 0 then |B| h,w is 0 for all w in R h ; clearly then if |B| h is 0 then |A B| h and |A ⊃ B| h are both 0, and if We can get similar substitution results for other contraposable biconditionals:
(1) For , the analog of the corollary is that if 
, and similarly for the other deMorgan laws
(similarly with all replaced by ).
(Indeed when Q is a noncontingent Liar sentence, (A ∧ ¬A) ⇒ Q and Q ⇒ (B ∨ ¬B).) These are all quite trivial: they can be obtained from obvious super-validities using Limited ⇒-Introduction.
Here is an important base-equivalence (which follows from laws below, but is worth stating separately here):
It shows a "near-redundancy" of ' ': it is eliminable when not in the scope of a or . More generally,
Proof. If | → A| g = 1 then there is a Y ∈ P g such that for all h ∈ Y , |A| h = 1; so by Regularity, for all < h, v > in F for which h ∈ Y , |A| h,v = 1; so for all h ∈ Y , I now list some less trivial laws. I will note which ones are universally valid, since this implies further validities not listed. (In the case of →-conditional sentences, we've seen that validity, universal validity and super-validity all coincide, but it seemed less distracting to simply mark them as universally valid below.) This is not intended as a systematic exploration of the laws that hold in the system, but is intended to give the general flavor of the impact of the construction, including considerably more than just establishing the laws of restricted quantification given at the start of the paper.
L1: Modus ponens and related laws for
Proof. 
L2: Modus ponens and related laws for and
All of these hold also with instead of . For any g, suppose |A| g = 1 and |(A ∧ C) B| g = 1. By the second equality, for every v in R g , if |A ∧ C| g,v = 1 then |B| g,v = 1. By the first equality and Regularity, |A| g,v = 1 for all v in R g . From these we get that for every v in R g if |C| g,v = 1 then |B| g,v = 1, and so |C B| g = 1.
Observe that from L1c and L2b we get L3: Connections to ⊃: positive
(a) For any g ∈J : If |A ⊃ B| g = 1 then either |A| g = 0 or |B| g = 1, so by Regularity, L4: Connections to ⊃: negative
is of course equivalent to A ∧ ¬B, and it might be more natural to rewrite these using A ∧ ¬B.
Proof. As already remarked, the implication (c) isn't universal: it depends on the reflexivity of @.
L5: Conjunction laws. Let be any of the conditionals →, , and (or, for that matter ⇒ or ⇒ nc , or any of the biconditionals).
, and the same with all changed to
(a) Given Limited ⇒ nc -Introd, we need only that for all g in J , and all v in R g , if 
and either |B| g = 0 or |C| g = 0. But by the previous, |B| g (i.e., |B| g,v g ) can't be 0, since v g is in R g . So |A| g is 1 and |C| g is 0, and Regularity gives that for all w in R g , |A| g,w = 1 and |C| g,w = 0, and so |A C| g = 0.
(c) I showed earlier that ⇒ nc universally implies →; so the → claim follows from (a), and we need only show that for all g in J , if |A (B ∧ C)| g = 0, then for all w in R g , |A| g,w = 1 and |B ∧ C| g,w = 0. In particular the second holds at v g , so either |B| g,v g = 0 or |C| g,v g = 0, so by Regularity either for all w in R g |B| g,w = 0 or for all w in R g |C| g,w = 0. Since in addition for all w in R g |A| g,w = 1, we have that either For example, the analog of (a) is that for each conditional ,
The proofs of this and the others are analogous to those of L5.
L6: Positive conjunctive syllogisms. Let be as in L5.
Proof. ( case) We need that for all g and v, if
That's clear: the premises imply that for some S 1 , S 2 ∈ Z g,v , (∀w ∈ S 1 )(|A| g,w ≤ |B| g,w ) and (∀w ∈ S 2 )(|B| g,w ≤ |C| g,w ); so letting S be the smaller of the two, we have (∀w ∈ S)(|A| g,w ≤ |C| g,w ), and so |A C| g,v = 1. 
; so letting Y be the smaller of the two, we have (∀h ∈ Y )(if |A| h = 1 then |C| h = 1), and so g(A → C) = 1.
An expanded version will prove useful:
The proof is essentially the same.
L7: Negative conjunctive syllogisms.
(a) We need that for all g and v, if |A B| g,v = 1 and |A C| g,v = 0 then |B C| g,v = 0. The premises imply that for some S 1 , S 2 ∈ Z g,v , (∀w ∈ S 1 )(|A| g,w ≤ |B| g,w ) and (∀w ∈ S 2 )(|A| g,w = 1 and |C| g,w = 0); so letting S be the smaller of the two, we have (∀w ∈ S)(|B| g,w = 1 and |C| g,w = 0), and so |B C| g,v = 0. 
and |C| g = 0; so by what's been shown we have g(B, C) < 1, |B| g = 1, and |C| g = 0; so |B → C| g = 0.
Note that the implications (b-i) and (b-ii) aren't universal: they depend on the reflexivity of @.
L8: Exportation.
Proof. For (a), we need that for any g ∈ J , if |A ∧ B ⇒ nc C| g = 1 then |A → (B C)| g = 1. Suppose the former. Then for some G in P g , (∀h ∈ G)(|A ∧ B C| h = 1). But by (the version of) L2c, this implies that (∀h ∈ G)(if |A| h = 1 then |B C| h = 1), which means that |A → (B C)| g = 1. The (b) case is analogous.
L9: Suffixing and Prefixing. Let be as in L5.
, and when it's we also get
Regarding (a + ), (b) and (c), note that we wouldn't expect the version of prefixing for a noncontraposable conditional: if Q is the Liar sentence, Q ⊥ gets value 1 everywhere when doesn't contrapose; but ( 
Then for each t, and each g in J, if |A(t)| g = 1 then |B(t)| g = 1. Reversing quantifiers and distributing the "for each t" quantifier, we have that for each g in J : if for each t |A(t)| g = 1 then for each t |B(t)| g = 1, and if for some t |A(t)| g = 1 then for some t |B(t)| g = 1. So if |∀x Ax| g = 1 then |∀x Bx| g = 1, and if |∃x Ax| g = 1 then |∃x Bx| g = 1; so |∀x Ax → ∀x Bx| @ = |∃x Ax → ∃x Bx| @ = 1. (c) If |∀x Ax → ∀x Bx| @ = 0 then |∀x Ax| @ = 1 and |∀x Bx| @ = 0. So for some t, |At| @ = 1 and |Bt| @ = 0. Using reflexivity of @ we have that |At → Bt| @ = 0, and result follows. Similarly for second.
There are corollaries for other defined conditionals, such as →→. For instance Observation: ∀x(Ax →→ Bx) ∀x Ax →→ ∀x Bx.
The proofs are rather trivial given the results already established, but just to be explicit: theory; 30 indeed, I'd expect, and hope for, variations that give rise to clear improvements in the laws. But what about the prospects for a radically different approach?
One thing one can certainly hope for is an approach involving only a single conditional. I've remarked that this inevitably requires the failure of some of the laws on my menu from Section 1 (and the expanded menu in Section 3), but one might be able to swallow that if suitably strong approximations to them were available. One natural idea is to look for a naive truth theory for the logic CK (also called RWK), which is a weakening of Lukasiewicz continuum-valued logic; I won't specify it in detail (you can find it in Priest, 2008, p. 228) , but it is a nonparaconsistent logic, and the laws involving the conditional include modus ponens plus A → A plus
(Note that while there are analogs of all of these in the system I've given, most require the two distinct conditionals and hence are weaker.) It is not known whether a naive truth theory is possible in CK-more on this in a moment-but even if it is, one must give up on items ( 30 One variation that will be obvious to those familiar with Field (2008) is to use revision-theoretic constructions for the fibers and/or the base-space, modeled after the fixed point constructions used here. For instance, to construct the fiber for a given →-booster g, we'd let
1 if (∃κ < μ)(∀ξ ∈ [κ, μ))(if |A| g,ξ = 1 then |B| g,ξ = 1) 0 if (∃κ < μ)(∀ξ ∈ [κ, μ))(|A| g,ξ = 1 ∧ |B| g,ξ = 0) 1 2 otherwise. The fiber for g would consist of the members of this sequence that keep coming back; its base node would be v g, where is a reflection ordinal for the sequence (in the sense of Gupta & Belnap, 2003, p. 172) . This would yield a Regularity Theorem for fibers. Similarly, letting || A|| g be the value of A at the reflection ordinal for g, we'd let The base space would consist of the members of this sequence that keep coming back, and the principal node would be the value at the reflection ordinal for this sequence. (The Kripke construction would be like the one in the present paper: an → -conditional can get value 0 even when its g-value is 1/2.) The "Fundamental Theorem" of Field (2008) would fail for the same reason that "Regularity" fails for the base space in the present construction. I haven't checked this out fully, but I doubt that it would lead to very different laws than those given by the present construction. I chose the fixed point construction rather than the revision construction in this paper partly because it is new and partly because it strikes me as somewhat more natural. These are consequences of CK, so if they are satisfactory surrogates then we could handle restricted quantification in a naive truth theory with a single conditional by getting a naive truth theory for CK.
But as I've said, no one knows how to give a naive truth theory for CK-the question of whether this could be done was explicitly raised in print 20 years ago (Restall, 1992) , but no one seems to have made significant progress on it. 33 Probably the naive truth theories in print for logics that come closest to CK (though they don't come very close at all) are my own in (2008) and several much earlier ones of Ross Brady's, most of which are discussed in his (2006) . Neither he nor I claimed to give an account of account of restricted quantification; and if one had defined the restricted universal quantifier in terms of the conditionals he or I provided, the accounts would have been ludicrous.
In the case of Field (2008) , the logic contains (CONTRAP), but only the rule forms of (CONJ), (WEAKENING) 34 , and (SUFFIX), and not even the rule form of (ASSERTION), that is, not even
The laws of restricted quantification that would have been delivered would have been, to a close approximation, those that would be delivered by the construction of this paper were all "if...then's" understood as . This means that not only (I) would fail (as is inevitable on a single-conditional construction), but so would (I-alt), and indeed so would even (And (VI) would also hold only in weakened rule form, but that's inevitable on a single conditional theory). As I said, that would be ludicrous for an account of restricted quantification. Brady's preferred one-conditional logics are in some respects stronger than the one in Field (2008) : they contain (CS), and the full (CONJ) rather than just the rule form. But like Field (2008) they don't validate even (WEAK ASSERTION), so were one to define restricted quantification one wouldn't get even the very weak forms (I-vw) and (I − -vw) of (I) and (I − ); and as with Field (2008) one would get only the rule form of (VI).
But things would be much worse: it's a feature of the Brady semantics that conditionals are often evaluated as false when they have true consequents or false antecedents. Because of this, if one used this conditional for restricted quantification not even the rule forms of (II) or (V) would hold. Thus from "Everything is B" one wouldn't be able to infer "All A are B", and from "Not all A are B" one wouldn't be able to infer "Something is both A and not B". That would be even more ludicrous as an account of restricted quantification than using Field (2008) . For these reasons, Brady prefers a two-conditional account of restricted quantifiers (Beall et al. 2006) , to be discussed below. the task at hand, since it's been known for many years that a naive truth theory is consistent even in Lukasiewicz continuum valued logic (see White, 1979) ; the problem is that in that logic the theory isn't ω-consistent, that is, consistent with a standard model of syntax (see Restall, 1992) , which also prevents a consistent naive satisfaction theory with the usual compositional rules for the quantifiers (see Hajek et al., 2000) . It was partly to prevent such pathologies that I insisted on a conservativeness requirement. 34 Though I only realized it later, the trivial way of getting (WEAKENING) while retaining (CONTRAP), namely defining a new conditional in terms of the old by disjoining with the material conditional, seems not to have a cost with respect to other laws of this system. Though that's largely because the other laws are so weak! (I use rather than for their second conditional since they take it to be noncontraposable.) So far very much like the account in this paper. However, though the second conditional in Beall et al. (2006) obeys the -weakening rule and hence delivers the rule form of (II), it doesn't satisfy the stronger -weakening axiom and so does not deliver the full (II).
This seems a substantial limitation. Beall (2009) recognized this, and his preferred account (p. 125) gets the strengthening by a different version of from that in Beall et al. (2006) : he uses a * , with A * B defined to be simply (A → B) ∨ B, where → is the conditional of the 2006 paper. But though this gives (II) in full form, it has tremendous costs: in particular, it precludes the validity of even the rule form of CONJ (and hence even the rule form of (IV)). The problem is that if A * B holds by virtue of A → B holding, and A * C holds by virtue of C holding, then one can't infer A * (B ∧ C) unless one can infer it from (A → B) ∧ C; and since with the 2006 conditional Beall is working with one can't infer A → C from C, there is no way to do this.
This problem would be alleviated had he started not from the → in Beall et al (2006) but from the in that paper (or some other conditional for which (WEAK WEAKENING) holds), that is, had he defined A * B as (A B) ∨ B; 37 but even then, the move would mean that even if the full (CONJ) holds for , only the rule form holds for * . In short, using the disjunctive trick to strengthen (II) from a rule to the full conditional results at best in a corresponding weakening of (IV).
Another matter: in both Beall et al. (2006) and Beall (2009) it is assumed that the conditional that goes with the restricted quantifier is to be "rule-weaker than" →, in the sense that This imposes a high cost: it rules out (I). (For with (W), (I) requires single-conditional pseudo-modus-ponens for , which is incompatible with naive truth.) Indeed, those papers don't even deliver (I-vw) and (I − -vw), though I see no obvious reason why some other paraconsistent account couldn't have these even if it contained (W).
To partially summarize what we have so far, no available paraconsistent two-conditional account delivers even (I-vw) or (I − -vw), and none delivers both the full (II) and the full (IV). But as far as I know there is no reason why improved paraconsistent theories couldn't obtain these.
But there are also in principle limitations on what any approach to the paradoxes that admits acceptance gluts (and hence disallows the explosion rule A, ¬A B) could deliver. The chief such limitation is that (assuming that the restricted quantifier conditional obeys modus ponens) we cannot have the rule
since with modus ponens it leads to explosion. It follows that we can't have
¬(A ∧ ¬B) A B,
since its antecedent is weaker. Because of these, we can't have even the rule forms of (II c ) (from Section 1) or (V*) (from Section 3): for instance, we can't infer from "Nothing is 37 He didn't because the account in Beall et al (2006) hasn't actually been shown consistent with naive truth theory, it is merely conjectured to be. 
